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Cert to CA3 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: The State of New Jersey has filed a brief in 
opposition to the petition for cert. 
~ 
CONTENTIONS: New Jersey makes the same arguments in oppo-
sition that Pennsylvania did in its brief: (1) The CA3 was right 
on the merits: (2) The split between the CA3 and CA4 does not 
require resolution by this Court: and (3) The SG's fears that the 
~~~u-~~ 
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-
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CA3 opinion will undermine the administration of other federal 
programs are unwarranted. 
DISCUSSION: I recommend denial for the reasons stated in 
the Preliminary Memorandum. 
August 2, 1982 Levene Opn in petn 
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SUMMARY: The CA3 held that petr had neither the statu-
tory authority nor a common law right to require resps to re-
pay funds advanced to them under Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 that petr determined in an 
administrative hearing had 
(;.r~ . J;. ~ ~ 
~h 
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FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965, now codified, as amended, at 
20 u.s.c. §§ 2701 et seq. (Supp. IV 1980), provides for feder-
al funding to states with heavy concentrations of children 
from low income families. The statute sets forth specific 
criteria to ensure that funds are spent only for the benefit 
lL ~ 
of disadvantaged children. - --
Grant payments may be made either in advance or by re-
imbursement. In the instant cases, the payments were all made 
in advance. 
The Secretary may conduct an audit at any time to de-
termine whether Title I monies were properly expended. 20 
U.S.C. § 2835 (Supp. IV 1980). (The authority to audit was 
previously contained in 20 u.s.c. § 1232c(a) (2) (1976) .) 
When the Secretary determines that funds have been mis-
spent, the statute sets forth several remedies. The original 
act authorized the Secretary to withhold funds or refuse to 
approve applications. Pub.L.No.874, tit. II, §§ 206, 210, 
codified as amended at 20 u.s.c. ~§ 2832, 2836 (Supp. IV 
1980). 
✓ 
In 1978, Title I was extensively amended and revised. -
Section 185, 20 U.S.C. § 2835 (Supp. IV 1980), was added to 
permit the Secretary to require states to reimburse the gov-
ernment for funds the states have misspent. It authorizes the 
Secretary to hear appeals on audit findings and to determine 
when Title I funds have been misspent or misapplied. Where he 
\ - - 3 - -
I Ji'~;;? 
so determines, "the Secretary shall require the repayment of 
the amount of funds under this subchapter which have been fi-
nally determined through the audit resolution process to have 
been misspent or misapplied." Id. 
In the early 1970's, the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare audited Pennsylvania for the fiscal years 
1968-1973 and New Jersy for 1971-73. The final audit reports, 
issued in 1975, found that both states had misapplied Title I 
funds. Both states filed applications for review with the 
Title I . Audit Hearing Board. 
The Audit Hearing Board was administratively estab-
lished in 1972 to provide states with an opportunity to chal-
lenge audit findings. It was succeeded on June 29, 1979, by 
the Education Appeal Board, which was created by the 1978 
Amendments to Title I. The Education Appeal Board assumed 
jurisdiction over resps' appeals • 
In February 1980, the Education Appeal Board found that 
New Jersey should repay $1,031,304 to the government. In May 
1980, it found that Pennsylvania should repay $422,424. The 
resps each petitioned the CA3 for review, arguing that the 
petr lacked both statutory authority and a common law right to 
administratively recoup Title I funds missoent prior to the 
1978 Amendments. (The petitions were consolidated in the CA.) 
The CA3 granted the petitions for review and remanded 
with instructions to vacate the orders requiring repayment. 
. v---
662 F. 2d 208 (CA3 1981). Relying on Pennhurst State school 
- -
- 4 -
and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981}, it held that 
V Sect ion 185 could not · be applied retroactively to authorize 
the Secretary to recoup funds misspent prior to 1978: 
[TJ he overarching principle of Pennhurst -- that the 
terms and conditions of a federal qrant must be set 
forth clearly and unambiguously in the statute autho-
rizing the grant -- precludes us from giving retroac-
tive effect to a statute passed five years after the 
last disputed funds were received. Such a result ~~ 
would require repayment of misspent funds out of a 
state's general treasury. Section 185 does not confer Lc..n:::ll-
aut]:ior i ~ e _pe..e.e- r tm~ t to i mpos e t J:i,e ,2.anc € ion§_ it 
adopted 1n these cases .- - - Ylu,;.,.. ? ---
~ thout deciding whether resp had a common law right to 
recoupment, the CA3 held that such a right could not be en-
forced administratively but "only by an action in a court of 
competent jurisdiction." It distinguished Mt. Sinai Hospital 
v. Weinberger, 517 F. 2d 329 (CA5 1975} , cert. denied, 425 
U.S. 935, which had held the government had a common law right 
to administratively recoup misspent Medicare funds. The Medi-
care funds in Mt. Sinai were distributed as reimbursement for 
monies already spent by the state: the Title I funds here were 
advanced to the states prior to the state's expenditure of 
monies for Title I services. The CA3 argued that use of the 
offset remedy where funds are advanced would "result in the ---- . ...., 
failure of the school districts to provide Title I services 
. 
during the year for which funding was withheld." By contrast, 
if the government uses its common-law right of setoff when it 
finds Medicare funds have been misspent, "Medicare beneficia-
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CONTENTIONS: Petr suggests three reasons for granting 
First, the decision below~uarely conflicts with the 
CA4's opinion in State of West Virginia v. Secretary of Educa-
tion, 667 F. 2d 417 (CA4 1981) (per curiam). In West Virginia, 
the CA4 held that the Secretary had both statutory and common 
law authority to~ ti~ ecou~ i tle I funds that 
had been misspent prior to 1978. Petr notes that there are 27 
cases pending before the Education Appeal Board involving au-
dit claims for $60 million in funds received by the states 
before 1978. 
Second, petr argues that " rt] he disruptive effects of 
the decision below can be expected to extend beyond Title I." 
Grantees under other statutes have already begun to use the 
CA3's decision as a basis to challenge the recoupment proce-
dures of other federal agencies. Petr notes that "as of June 
30, 1981, at least $374 million of audit-related debts were 
outstanding." 
Thi rd, petr contends that the CA3 mis interpreted con-
I 
,I 
trolling legal principles, in particular, th_: ~ ~~or- l ~ 
ity of the United States government to recover funds illegally 
'\ - -
paid. Petr argues that the CA3 incorrectly distinguished -cases like Mt. Sinai Hospital, and that the Secretary's re-
coupment authority should not turn on whether he advances mon-
ies to the states or reimburses them for funds they have 
spent. 
" - -- 6 -
Resp Pennsylvania (New Jersey has not filed a brief in 
opposition) contends that the split between the CA3 and CA4 
does not justify plenary review by this Court. The CA4 opin-
ion is short (2 pp), ill-considered, and conclusory. It was 
filed as an unpublished order without benefit of oral argument 
two days after the CA3 opinion came down. It was later pub-
lished as a per curiam opinion on the motion of the SG. 1 The 
West Virginia court did not mention the CA3 opinion. In hold-
ing that the 1978 Amendments applied retroactively, it did not 
discuss · Pennhurst. It did not explain why the Secretary had 
common law authority to administratively recoup misspent 
funds, but merely cited Mt. Sinai Hospital. 
Second, resp contends that only a "small and decreasing 
number of disputes" would be affected by a decision in this 
case. The CA3's decision only applies to disputes over Title 
I funds received by the states prior to 1978. 
Third, resp discounts petr's predictions that applica-
tion of the CA3' s decision would have dire effects on many 
other federal grant-in-aid programs. "Application of this 
decision to other federal grant-in-aid programs is not likely 
unless a similar enforcement structure can be shown to be part 
1west Virginia did not file a petition for cert when the 
unpublished order in West Virginia was filed. After the CA4 
granted the SG's motion to publish the order, West Virginia moved 
this Court to direct the clerk to accept for filing an untimely 
petition for cert. This Court denied that motion on April 26, 
1982. 
l - - 7 - -
of the statutory scheme in those programs." 
The states of Maryland and West Virginia each filed 
briefs as amicus curiae in support of the petition for certio-
rari. They urge the Court to grant cert and affirm. 
DISCUSSION: Although this is a strong case for cert, I 
recommend denial. The CA4 decision is very short and 
conclusory. The Court should wait until some CA rejects the 
CA3 position in a carefully reasoned opinion. Moreover, the 
matter is not pressing, despite the SG's claim of imminent 
disaster for the federal government. Only 27 cases involving ~.1 
pre-1978 funds await resolution. The amount of money claimed 
by the federal government -- $60 million -- is likely to be 
drastically reduced in the appeals process. 2 As for the SG's 
claim that the CA3 decision threatens the administration of 
other federal grant-in-aid programs, the Court can cross that 
bridge when it comes to it. 
I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
July 30, 1982 Levene Opn in petn 
2For example, the federal auditors initially claimed 
$10,000,000 from Pennsylvania. That figure was ultimately 
reduced to $422,424. 
.11,i,.. - - September 27, 1982 Court "Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
No. 81-2125: 
Bell v. New Jersey 
.From: Mark April 16, 1983 
Whether 
Questions Presented 
the Department of Education has authority , _,.,,-,tlncfer-
/ 
statutory or common law, to issue an administrative order requir-





This case involves Title I of the Elementarv and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965, which provides federal funds to the states 
for the purpose of improving the education of children of low-
income families. The amount given to any local educational agen----cy {LEA) depends on the number of low-income families in the 
area. And the funds are distributed only after the state educa-
tional agency {SEA) provides assurances that the money will be -- - -
spent in accordance with statutory conditions. -- ----~ -In 1975 DOE auditors determined that resps New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania had misapplied substantial sums -- $1.1 million and 
$1.3 million, respectively -- between 1970 and 1973. These find-
ings were affirmed on administrative appeal in 1980, though the - ~-------------amounts were reduced to $1 million and $.4 million. The agency 
found that resps improperly used funns in districts with insuffi-
cient numbers of low-income children and for general aid purposes 
- ~ ~ --= ~ 
rather than for the special needs of educationally deprived chil-
dren. See Brief for SG at 11 n.18. Resps were ordered to repay -this amount to the Federal Government. -Resps sought review in CA3. Judge Rosenn, joined by Judges 
Adams and Higginbotham, held that the Government lacked authority 
to compel repayment. In 1978, §185 was added to Title I, 20 
u.s.c. §2835, expressly giving this authority to the Secretary of 
Education. But CA3 declined to apply this retroactively, relying 
on the principle established in Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), 
that "if Congress intends to impose a condition on a grant of 




the Government's alternative argument that it could order repay-
d . J( 1 ment un er 1 ts common- aw 
-,, 
right to recover money distributed ---under a contract. CA3 declined to decide precisely what right of 
recovery existed, holding that whatever that right was, it could 
be enforced only through a civil action in a court of competent 
jurisdiction. DOE has no independent authority to order repay-
ment of misspent federal grant funds. 
This Court granted cert in light of a fuquare confl i@ with 
CA4. The Government is supported by an amicus brief from the 
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law. Resps are support-
ed by numerous states, local government organizations, and educa-
tional organizations. 
II. Discussion 
The issues here are (i) whether the Department of Education 
is entitled to recovery of money that a state recipient has spent 
in violation of the grant conditions, and (ii) whether the De-
partment can recoup such funds through the administrative proc-
ess. In my view the answer to both questions is "yes," and I 
therefore recommend that CA3 be reversed. 
:r-
A 
This is a complex case, and it is important to have a gener-
al understanding of the statutory developments. Before 1978, no 
-------------- - ----- - -
statutory provision expressly authorized DOE to recover misap-
plied funds. Rather, the statute provided two sanctions for non- Jl~ 
-H> 
compliance with grant conditions: (i} disapproval of a SEA's lf?K 
/ 
application, and (ii) withholding of payments until compliance is .1-w-tJ 
~h::,u 
- - 4. 
achieved. The agency's regulations tracked the statute, provid-
ing for disapproval of an application or withholding of funds, 
but not providing for repayment. 
In 1978 Congress adopted §185, which gives the Department - -authority to require "the repayment of the amount of funds under ----this subchapter which have been finally determined through the 
audit resolution process to have been misspent or misapplied." 
20 u.s.c. §2835. Under this provision, the Department clearly 
/'J;sd- . 
had authority to order resps to make repayments. CA3 refused, 
however, to apply §185 retroactively. 
B 
In my view, the decisive issue in the case is whether, prior 
. ---- -- --,, \\ 
to 1978, the Government had a right to recover, in any forum or 
proceeding, funds that were misspent. Let me explain why I think 
this is critical. If the Department did not have such a right, 
then retroactive application of §185 would amount to retroactive 
imposition of a new and unanticipated substantive liability, and 
this would be contrary to the principle of Pennhurst I. If, on 
the other hand, the Government did have some enforceable right to 
obtain repayment: of- misspent-- funds, then I think a retroactive 
application of §185 is permissible. In that case, the substan-
tive liability would be unchanged; all that would be new is that 
---- --- -
an additional enforcement device would be created. And, of 
~~ --- ---- .-- - -
course, if the Government already had a right to recovery through 
the administrative process, then §185 merely would have codified 
this right. 




ment derived authority to recover misspent funds. The SG relies 
on three sources of authorization: (i) the Federal Claims Col-
lection Act of 1966, 31 u.s.c. §§951 et seq., (ii) the Govern-
ment's inherent, common-law right to recoupment, and (iii) im-..__ 
plicit statutory authorization. 
1. As to the first argument, I think nothing in the Federal 
Claims Collection Act bears on the existence of this particular 
right to recovery. The Act directs the head of each agency, act-
ing under regulations established by the Attorney General and the 
Comptroller General, to "attempt collection of all claims of the 
United States for money or property arising out of the activities 
of, or referred to, his agency." 31 u.s.c. §952(a). Nothing in 
the Act appears to create any substantive right to recovery of 
misspent grant money; the Act merely permits collection of claims 
that do exist. 
2. As to the second argument, I am unconvinced that the Gov-
ernment has a "common-law right of recoupmen t" that necessarily 
authorizes it to demand repayment of misapplied grant funds. The 
cases cited by the SG are from 1890, 1896, 1938, 1920, 1841, etc. Sc;-
~ 
I have not had time to read all of these cases, but my impression v,,,...-
is that they deal essentially with basic contractual situations, ~ 
~, United States and a contractor have a dispute. N f 
£-4~ 
one o 
them deals with the more recent, and more sensitive, situation of 
grant-in-aid funds to the states. In short, I do not think that 
this is an issue to be decided by reference to an alleged over-
arching principle of the "common law." 
3. That leaves the SG' s final argument that the pre-1978 
- -
6. 
statute contained i l!!Plicit authorization for a right of recovery • 
.., ----~ --------------------
Resps and amici contend that the express statutory authorization 
for withholding of funds or disapproval of application is suffi-
cient to enforce Title I, and therefore no other remedies should 
be implied. The SG argues, however, that the following factors 
demonstrate that Congress intended that DOE be able to recover 
misspent funds: 
-In~ ongress enacted §424, 20 u.s.c. §1232d, giving DOE 
the authority t ~ udit state programs. The Senate Report stated --- ~ ,,. ,,,._,, 
that "exceptions have been taken to certain expenditures of title 
I," that these exceptions "appear to be well founded," and that 
"[e]ven though there may be difficulties arising from recovery of 
improperly used funds, those exceptions must be enforced if the 
Congress is to carry out its responsibility to the taxpayer." s. 
Rep. No. 91-634, p. 83-84 (1970). This suggests Congress thought 
repayment could ~ ered. c2) -Ina the agency established the Title I Audit Hearing 
Board for the purpose of hearing audit disputes and enforcing -- -repayme_E t. 
- -I ~ Congress e ~ cted a 5-!,ear statute of ! imita ~ions on 
state obligations to repay misspent funds: "No state or local 
-----~-~ ---- w ... 
education agency shall be liable to refund any payment made to 
such agency under this Act (including Title I of this Act) which 
was subsequently determined to be unauthorized by law, if such 
payment was made more than five years before such agency received 
final written notice that such payment was unauthorized." 20 
u.s.c. §884 (1976). This is an extremely strong suggestion J hat - ~ -----
- - 7. 
Congress thought it clear that the agency had authority to order 
... -----------
refunds of Title I funds. ----- .... 
-In 1978, when Congress adopted §185, there were several 
indications in the legislative history that Congress thought it 
was confirming the preexisting powers of the agency. 
Brief for Lawyers Committee at 15-16.) 
(See, e.g., 
I find these arguments persuasive. These congressional ac-
tions, combined with their legislative history, convince me that 
Congress wanted DOE to be able to recover misspent funds. They 
also suggest that the states had reason to be aware that misspent 
funds might have to be refunded. I conclude that the statute 
im..e_licitly authorized the Government to recover these funds. Ac--
cordingly, there is no unfairness in permitting the Department to 
use the specific administrative remedy provided in §185. 
C 
I should note, however, that this is the type of argument -
you have found unpersuasive in the context of implying causes of ~ 
action and/or remedies available to private beneficiaries of fed-
eral programs. JUSTICE WHITE's opinion in Guardians Association, 
No. 81-431, is a good example. He states (citing Pennhurst I): 
"Remedies to enforce spending power statutes 
must respect the privilege of the recipient of 
federal funds to withdraw and terminate its 
receipt of federal money rather than assume 
the further obligations and duties that a 
court has declared are necessary for compli-
ance .... Thus, declaratory and injunctive 
relief ordering future compliance with the 
declared statutory standards are presumed to 
be the only proper remedies in such cases. 
Absent clear congressional intent or valid 
regulatory or con t ract ual prov i sions to the 
contrary, additional relief in the form of 




that a court might identify should be 
hela." (trp. at1."0-n.) 
~~ ith- ,. 
~ 
Still, I believe this case is _ 
~ 
because it .__ 
involves the remedies ~vailable to the Federal Government rather -than to private litigants. A major concern in Pennhurst I and 
- -----
other private right of action cases is that by implying a right 
of action for private parties, or by retroactively imposing 
unforseen obligations on the use of the funds, the federal courts 
will expand vastly the potential liabili2~the ~~~~Z:,'- · 
( ~/f- C~ ~~lk, - 6/ · 
the funds -- indeed, the refief imposed by a fe eral court could 
far exceed the amount of the grant. In contrast, the issue here 
is simply whether the state must give back money it spent improp---------- -
erly. The amount of the liability is limited to the amount that -was misspent. And the remedy is one that is directly related to 
the Government's ability to control the use of the granted funds. 
Again, I think the legislative background sufficient to indicate 
that Congress acted on the assumption that the agency would be 
able to recover misspent funds. 
D 
There is one final point worth mentioning. One of resps' -basic complaints is with the substantive determination that they 
misspent the funds. They believe that they spent the Title I 
money in good faith under ambiguous criteria, and that therefore 
it is an unfair penalty to require large reimbursements. The 
issue of whether the states actually violated the statutory con-
ditions, however, is not before the Court. (New Jersey, but not 
Pennsylvania, challenged this substantive finding in CA3, but the 
court did not reach the issue.) Rather, the issue is whether DOE 
1~ 
- - 9. 
has a right to recover funds that were misspent. This issue is 
the same regardless of whether the states' violations were tech-
nical or grossly unlawful. 
I also note that there is a "grantback" provision under 
which a state may receive back 75% of the funds it is forced to 
repay to the Federal Government. See 20 a.s.c. §1234e(a) (2). 
This strikes me as a reasonable provision that prevents serious 
injustice -- and serious financial crises for states that must 
repay funds from occurring. I therefore think the Court 
should ignore the suggestion that the states did not actually 
misspend the money involved here. 
III. Conclusion 
The decision below should be reversed. The Court should 
hold that from the time resps misspent these funds Title I has 
permitted DOE to recover money spent improperly by the states. 
Because the statute has always permitted the Government to recov-
er misapplied funds, there is no unfairness in permitting the 
agency to use §185's administrative process to recover funds that 
were misspent prior to the adoption of §185. The case should be 
remanded to CA3 for further proceedings, including consideration 
of New Jersey's challenge to the substantive violation found by 
the agency. 
~ - -
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-2125 
TERREL H. BELL, SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, PE-
TITIONER v. NEW JERSEY AND PENNSYLVANIA 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case we consider both the rights of the Federal Gov-
ernment when a State misuses funds advanced as part of a 
federal grant-in-aid program under Title I of the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act and the manner in which the 
Government may assert those rights. We hold that the Fed-
eral Government may recover misused funds, that the De-
partment of Education may determine administratively the 
amount of the debt, and that the State may seek judicial re-
view of the agency's determination. 
I 
The respondents, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, received 
grants from the Federal Government under Title I of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), Pub. 
89-10, 79 Stat. 27, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq. 
(1976 ed. Supp. V). Title I created a program designed to 
improve the educational opportunities available to disad-
vantaged children. § 102, 20 U. S. C. § 2701 (1976 ed. Supp. 
V). Local educational agencies obtain federal grants 
through state educational agencies, which in turn obtain 
grants from the Department of Education 1 upon providing 
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assurances to the Secretary that the local educational agen-
cies will spend the funds only on qualifying programs. 
§ 182(a), 20 U. S. C. § 2734 (1976 ed. Supp. V). 2 In auditing 
New Jersey for the period September 1, 1970 through Au-
gust 1973, and Pennsylvania for the period July 1, 1967 
through June 30, 1973, to ensure compliance with ESEA and 
the regulations promulgated under ESEA, federal auditors 
determined that each State had misapplied funds. After re-
view requested by the States, the Education Appeal Board 
(the Board) modified the findings of the auditors and assessed 
a deficiency of $1,031,304 against New Jersey and a defi-
ciency of $422,424.29 against Pennsylvania. The Secretary 
declined to review the orders establishing the deficiencies, 
93 Stat. 668, 20 U. S. C. §§ 3401 et seq. (1976 ed. Supp. IV). The agency 
involved in many of the events relevant to this litigation was the predeces-
sor, the Office of Education, and the official involved was the Commis-
sioner of Education. For simplicity, unless the distinction is significant, 
we will refer to both the Office of Education and the Department of Educa-
tion as the Department of Education and to both the Commissioner of Edu-
cation and the Secretary of Education as the Secretary of Education. 
Similarly, we refer to both the Title I Audit Hearing Board and its succes-
sor, the Education Appeal Board, as the Education Appeal Board. By a 
regulation, 44 Fed. Reg. 30528, 43807 (1979), specifically authorized by 
statute, 20 U. S. C. § 1234a(f) (1976 ed. Supp. V), the Department trans-
ferred to the Education Appeal Board appeals pending before the Title I 
Audit Hearing Board when the Education Appeal Board was created. 
2 Section 182(a) provides in part: 
"The Secretary shall not approve an application . . . until he has made spe-
cific findings in writing ... that he is satisfied that the assurances in such 
application and the assurances contained in its general application under 
section 435 of the General Education Provisions Act (where applicable) will 
be carried out." 
Section 435(b), 20 U. S. C. § 1232d(b) (1976 ed. Supp. V) requires assur-
ances "that each program will be administered in accordance with all appli-
cable statutes, regulations, program plans, and applications." 
Section 182 was added in 1978, Pub. 95--561, 92 Stat. 3188, but a substan-
tially similar provision was in effect from the date of the enactment of 
ESEA. See § 206, 79 Stat. 31. 
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and, after a period for comment, the orders became final. 
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a, 86a-87a. Both States filed 
timely petitions for review in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, which consolidated the cases and 
held that the Department did not have the authority to issue 
the orders. It therefore did not reach New Jersey's argu-
ments that the State had not in fact misapplied the funds, 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a, or Pennsylvania's arguments chal-
lenging the agency's rulemaking procedures and its applica-
tion of ESEA's limitations provision, i bid. 
II 
The threshold question in this case, one that need not de-
tain us long, is whether the court below had jurisdiction. 
Since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the 
court below could hear the case only if authorized by statute. 
It premised its exercise of jurisdiction alternatively on § 195 
of ESEA, 20 U. S. C. § 2851 (1976 ed. Supp. V), and on § 455 
of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA), Pub. 
95-561, 92 Stat. 2350, 20 U. S. C. § 1234d (1976 ed. Supp. V). 
The first provision permits judicial review in the courts of ap-
peal of the Secretary's final action with respect to audits, and 
the second permits judicial review in the courts of appeal of 
actions of the Board. 3 Although only § 195 explicitly re-
3 Both prov1s10ns were originally enacted as part of the Education 
Amendments of 1978 (1978 amendments), Pub. 95-561, §§ 195, 455, 92 
Stat. 2143, 2196-2197, 2350. We agree with the Court of Appeals that 
those provisions apply retroactively, though we pretermit the question 
whether the substantive provisisons of the 1978 amendments also apply 
retroactively, see infra, at--. Under the pre-1978 version of ESEA, 
there was no explicit provision for judicial review of decisions of the Title I 
Audit Hearing Board. The presumption that review is available, see 5 
U. S. C. §§ 701(a), 702, 704; Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 
136, 140 (1967), coupled with the absence of any indication in the statute 
that the decision is committed wholly to the discretion of the agency or that 
review is otherwise precluded, see 5 U. S. C. § 701(a), leads to the conclu-
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quires "final" action, we think that a final order is necessary 
under either section. The strong presumption is that judi-
cial review will be available only when agency action becomes 
final, FPC v. Metropolitan Edison, 304 U. S. 375, 383-385 
(1938); see generally 5 U. S. C. § 704; 16 Wright, Miller, Coo-
per & Gressman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3942 
(1977), and there is nothing in § 455 to overcome that pre-
sumption. Indeed, § 455 provides judicial review of deci-
sions made under § 452, § 453, and § 454, 20 U. S. C. §§ 1234a, 
1234b, 1234c (1976 ed. Supp. V), each of which includes a sub-
section dealing with finality and suggesting that only a "deci-
sion" of the Board is subject to review. See §§ 452(d), 
453(d), 454(d). 20 U. S. C. §§ 1234a(d), 1234b(d), 1234c(d) 
(1976 ed. Supp. V). Consequently, we conclude that, at 
least in the absence of an appealable collateral order, 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331, n.11 (1976); Cohen 
v. Beneficial Finance Corp, 337 U. S. 541, 545-547 (1949), 
the federal courts may exercise jurisdiction only over a final 
order of the Department. We therefore must determine 
whether this case meets that requirement. 
The Board's order, which became the agency's decision, 
merely established the amount of the deficiency owed by the 
States to the Federal Government, leaving for further "dis-
cussion" the method of repayment. 4 See App. to Pet. for 
grant of jurisdiction over cases involving federal questions, 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1331 (1976 ed. Supp. V). See generally 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law 
Treatise § 23:5 at 135 (1983); C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 103 (3d 
ed. 1976). Once the Department transferred the cases of the Title I Audit 
Hearing Board to the Education Appeal Board, 44 Fed. Reg. 30528, 43807 
(1979); see § 451, 20 U. S. C. § 1234(f) (1976 ed. Supp. V) (authorizing 
transfer), the effect of the 1978 amendments was merely to change the 
forum for review. As Justice Holmes explained for the Court in Hallowell 
v. Commons, 239 U. S. 506, 508 (1916), a change of forum "takes away no 
substantive right" and thus can apply retroactively. 
• New Jersey seems to take the view that the Secretary has settled the 
method of collection by demanding repayment. See Brief for Respondent 
-
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Cert. 88a, 90a. The possibility of further proceedings in the 
agency to determine the method of repayment does not, in 
our view, render the orders less than "final." The situation 
here corresponds to the ordinary adjudication by a trial court 
that a plaintiff has a right to damages. -Although the judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff is not self-executing and he may 
have to undertake further proceedings to collect the damages 
awarded, that possibility does not prevent appellate review 
of the decision, which is final. Our cases have interpreted 
pragmatically the requirement of administrative finality, fo-
cusing on whether judicial review at the time will disrupt the 
administrative process. See, e. g., FTC v. Standard Oil 
Co., 449 U. S. 232, 239 (1980); Port of Boston Marine Termi-
nal Assn v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U. S. 62, 
71 (1970). Review of the agency's decision at this time will 
not disrupt administrative proceedings any more than review 
of a trial court's award of damages interferes with its pro-
cesses. Indeed, full review of the judgment may expedite 
the collection process, since the States know their ultimate 
New Jersey 16, n. 1, 28, n. 15, 33-34. In fact, the record shows that each 
State received notice of the Board's decision, stating, "[The State] should 
refund [the amount] to the Department of Education. Appropriate au-
thorities within the Department will be in touch with you at an early date 
to discuss the method of repayment of the funds in question." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 88a, 90a. 
New Jersey has reproduced as an appendix to its brief a letter demand-
ing immediate repayment, App. to Brief of Respondent New Jersey la-2a, 
suggesting that the Secretary has already determined the manner of collec-
tion. That letter is not part of the record , and we are inclined, in any 
event, to view it as an initial proposal of a means of collection. Cf. 4 CFR 
§ 102.2 (1983) (regulation under Federal Claims Collection Act, Pub. 
89-508, 80 Stat. 309, 31 U. S. C. § 952, requiring agency to make written 
demand for repayment in attempting collection of claims). Moreover, the 
Secretary, who is the petitioner, has not asked us to decide what means of 
collection are available to him, but only whether he is a creditor. Since 
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liability with certainty. The agency's determination of the 
deficiency here represented a definitive statement of its posi-
tion, determining the rights and obligations of the parties, 
see Standard Oil Co., supra, 449 U. S., at 239 (explaining 
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 (1967)); Port 
of Boston, supra, 400 U. S., at 71; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
United States, 363 U. S. 202, 205 (1960). Therefore, the 
Court of Appeals properly took jurisdiction of the case, and 
we too have jurisdiction to address the merits. 
III 
Turning to the merits, the States first challenge the Secre-
tary's order by asserting that, even if the Board properly de-
termined that they misused the funds, the Federal Govern-
ment cannot recover the amount misused. Thus, we must 
decide whether, assuming that a State has misused funds 
granted to it under Title I of ESEA, it becomes liable to the 
the Federal Government for those funds. The Education 
Amendments of 1978 (1978 amendments), Pub. 95-561, 92 
Stat. 2143, 20 U. S. C. §§ 2701 et seq. (1976 ed. Supp. V), 
rendered explicit the authority of the Secretary to recover 
funds misspent by a recipient. 20 U.S. C. §2835(b) (1976 
ed. Supp. V), 92 Stat. 2190. Although the final determina-
tion of the Board in each of these appeals occurred after the 
enactment of the 1978 amendments, the audits reviewed peri-
ods before 1978. Both States take the position that, before 
the 1978 amendments, the Secretary's sole remedy for non-
compliance was prospective: he could withhold funds from a 
State that did not comply, until the State brought its pro-
gram into compliance, § 146, 20 U. S. C. §241j, or he could 
deny applications for funds for noncomplying programs, 
§ 142, 20 U. S. C. § 241f. 5 Further, they contend that the 
5 New Jersey explains now that it does not object to what it character-
izes as a "setoff' by the Secretary but that the Secretary did not request 
-
81-2125---OPINION 
BELL v. NEW JERSEY 
-
7 
1978 amendments operated prospectively only. 6 The Secre-
tary has argued both that the 1978 amendments had retroac-
tive effect and that the right of recovery existed in the pre-
1978 version of ESEA. Since we are persuaded that the 
that remedy in the Court of Appeals. Brief for Respondent New Jersey 16, 
n. 10. That is, if the Secretary properly determined that New Jersey mis-
used funds, he could, in New Jersey's view, withhold part of the funds that 
the State would otherwise be entitled to receive under Title I of ESEA in 
future years, and the State would undertake a smaller Title I program in 
those years. New Jersey's proposal does not, however, amount to a "re-
covery'' by the Federal Government. Ordinarily, a State would obtain a 
certain sum in Title I funds by giving its assurances that it would expend 
that sum for Title I programs. § 142(a)(l), 20 U. S. C. § 241f(a)(l). New 
Jersey, however, proposes that it receive a smaller amount of money than 
it would otherwise be eligible to receive and that it give assurances that it 
would use only that smaller amount for Title I programs. See Brief for 
Resp. New Jersey at 16, n. 10, 28, n. 15, 34, Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. In other 
words, the Federal Government would pay itself back by cutting back on 
the Title I program at no cost to New Jersey. The Secretary does not 
view this form of "setoff' as satisfactory. Id., at 13-14. Thus, despite 
New Jersey's assertion that there is no longer any dispute between it and 
the Secretary over the availability of some remedy, Brief for Respondent 
New Jersey 17, n. 10, a controversy remains. 
6 Pennsylvania has suggested that the Education Consolidation and Im-
provements Act of 1981 (ECIA) governs this case. Brief for Respondent 
Pennsylvania at 44. It does not, however, seek the application of anything 
but the substantive standards introduced by that Act for determining com-
pliance. On the contrary, it explicitly argues for the application of the pro-
cedures and remedies of the pre-1978 ESEA. Id., at 42. 
In any event, even if we misapprehend Pennsylvania's argument and it 
seeks full retroactivity of ECIA, our result would not differ, for the reme-
dies of the ECIA clearly include a repayment remedy. See Pub. 95-561 
§ 452(e), 92 Stat. 2348, 20 U. S. C. § 1234a(e) (1976 ed. Supp. V), made ap-
plicable to ECIA by § 400(b), 20 U. S. C. § 122(b); see also 47 Fed. Reg. 
52348 (1982) (requiring repayment of funds misused under ECIA). We 
decide here only whether the States can be held liable for the misuse of 
funds, and we leave for the Court of Appeals on remand the question 
whether the substantive standards of the ECIA or the 1978 amendments 
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pre-1978 version contemplated that States misusing federal 
funds would incur a debt to the Federal Government for the 
amount misused, we need not address the possible retroac-
tive effect of the 1978 amendments. 7 
Section 207(a)(l) of ESEA, Pub. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, 32, 
originally provided: 
"The Commissioner shall, subject to the provisions of 
§ 208 [dealing with inadequate appropriations], from 
time to time pay to each State, in advance or otherwise, 
the amount which the local educational agencies of that 
State are eligible to receive under this part. Such pay-
ments shall take into account the extent (if any) to which 
any previous payment to such State educational agency 
under this title (whether or not in the same fiscal year) 
was greater or less than the amount which should have 
been paid to it." 
This provision, which remained substantially unchanged as 
part of Title I until 1970, in our view, gives the Federal Gov-
ernment a right to the amount of any funds overpaid. The 
plain language of the statute recognizes the right, 8 and the 
' This disposition also permits us to pretermit decision on the alternative 
argument offered by the Secretary-that the Government has a common 
law right to recover funds any time the recipient of a grant fails to comply 
with the conditions of the grant. Compare 2 R. Cappalli, Federal Grants 
and Cooperative Agreements §§ 8:12, 8:15 (1982) (suggesting statutory or 
regulatory authorization necessary); Willcox, The Function and Nature of 
Grants, 22 Ad. L. Rev. 125, 131 (1970) (same), with Mount Sinai Hospital 
v. Weinberger, 517 F. 2d 329 (CA5 1975) (suggesting that authority exists 
in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary), cert. denied, 425 
U. S. 935 (1976); West Virginia v. Secretary of Education, 667 F . 2d 417 
(CA4 1981) (per curiam) (specific statutory authority unnecessary). Cf. 
California v. Block , 663 F. 2d 855 (CA9 1981) (regulation requiring repay-
ment of misspent funds invalid where statute required repayment of funds 
misspent with "gross negligence"). See generally Milwaukee v. Illinois, 
451 U. S. 304 (1981); United States v. Wurts, 303 U. S. 414 (1938). 
8 The only other remotely plausible reading is that suggested by New 
Jersey, seen. 5, supra-that the Secretary is to reduce grants below the 
-
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legislative history supports that natural reading. The Sen-
ate Report explained, "Since the State is given no authority 
to retain excess sums paid to it under the title, any excess 
paid to a State would have to be returned or taken into ac-
count in making subsequent payments to the State." 8. Rep. 
No. 146, 89th Cong, 1st Sess., 14 (1965). Indeed, the Com-
mittee obtained asurances from the Department that it would 
recapture these payments, and the debate on the floor 
termed those assurances "an essential condition for enacting 
the proposed legislation." 111 Cong. Rec. 7690 (1965). 9 
In 1970, Congress enacted GEPA, Pub. 91-230, 84 Stat. 
164, the main function of which was to bring the general pro-
visions of prior law together into a single title. See H. R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 91-937, p. 97 (1970). Its provisions apply to 
programs under Title I, 20 U. 8. C. § 1221(b), and it was in 
amount that the State would otherwise be eligible to receive, and the State 
is to undertake a less extensive Title I program, so that the Federal Gov-
ernment recovers nothing: it pays less, but it receives correspondingly less 
in the way of Title I programs. Under that reading, the State would have 
no liability to the Federal Government for misspent funds. 
That reading is no more than remotely plausible. First, it is hardly 
likely that Congress intended disadvantaged children to suffer twice: once 
when the State misspent the funds and once when the State cancels an oth-
erwise eligible program because of the Secretary's refusal to fund it. Sec-
ond, § 207 required the Secretary to use as his starting point the amount 
"the local educational agencies of that State are eligible to receive" and to 
adjust that amount for past misuses. But a State only becomes "eligible" 
by giving its assurances that it will expend the grant on Title I programs. 
See S. Rep. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1965); 142(a)(l), 20 U. S. C. 
§ 241f(a)(l). Section 207, then, must contemplate that the Federal Gov-
ernment will receive the same amount in Title I programs but will pay the 
State something less than that amount-a net recovery. 
9 The debates in the House also suggested such a concern and a desire to 
hold the States accountable in every way possible: 
"It would seem ... that insofar as the Congress can accomplish this end, 
rules of accountability, economy, and efficiency will be insisted upon, so 
that no Federal funds are improperly or wastefully used or diverted to uses 
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force for some of the years at issue here. Section 415 of 
GEPA is substantially the same as the original § 207(a)(l) of 
Title I, 10 and its language likewise creates a right to impose 
liability on the States. In enacting GEP A, Congress again 
made clear its intention that States return misused funds. 
The Senate Committee explained, "Even though there may 
be difficulties arising from recovery of improperly used 
funds, those exceptions must be enforced if the Congress is to 
carry out its responsibility to the taxpayer." S. Rep. No. 
91-634, p. 84 (1970). II 
Moreover, this interpretation of§ 207(a)(l) and § 415 enjoys 
the support of later Congresses, of administrative practice, 
and of commentators. Of course, the view of a later Con-
gress does not establish the meaning of an earlier enactment, 
but it does have persuasive value. See, e.g., Bowsher v. 
Merck, -- U. S. --, --, n. 12 (1983). The discussion 
of the 1978 amendments to ESEA reveals that Congress 
thought that recipients were already liable for any funds they 
misused. Rep. Corrada explained: 
10 Section 415 reads: 
"Payments pursuant to grants or contracts under any applicable program 
may be made in installments, and in advance or by way of reimbursement, 
with necessary adjustments on account of overpayments or underpay-
ments, as the Secretary may determine. " 20 U. S. C. § 1226a-1 (1976 ed. 
Supp.IV). 
Section 415 was originally numbered § 425. 
11 The quoted language comes from the Senate Committee's discussion of 
"Sections 422, 423, and 425 [since renumbered as § 415]." The Court of 
Appeals concluded that the heading reflected a typographical error, and 
that the discussion referred to §§ 422, 423, and 424. See App. to Pet. 
15a-16a. It does seem likely that the intended reference was § 424, but 
we fail to see why that feature should, as New Jersey argues, render this 
language any less relevant. Section 424 required certain types of record-
keeping ofrecipients and gave the Secretary power to audit. Auditing the 
required records would reveal whether or not the Secretary had overpaid a 
recipient, and the Senate Committee clearly thought that overpayments 
would lead to a recovery, as provided by the former§ 425. 
-
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"[T]itle I, ESEA ... and [the] regulations currently pro-
vide for two main enforcement mechanisms at the Fed-
eral level: First the withholding of title I funds from a 
State or local educational agency when a violation is dis-
covered; and second, the repayment of misspent funds 
after an audit. 
"[The] repayment authority has been used in the last 
couple of years on a number of occasions and has been an 
effective measure .... Approximately one-third of these 
cases have reached final resolution and have required 
repayment. 
"The proposed amendments would . . . solve the prob-
lems with the existing audit repayment . . . authority." 
124 Cong. Rec. 20612 (1978) (emphasis added)." 
Later, in 1981, Senator DeConcini introduced an amendment 
that would have prevented collection of any debts arising 
from misuse of Title I funds before 1978. 127 Cong. Rec. 
S5427 (May 21, 1981). The chair ultimately ruled the 
amendment out of order, id., at S5430, S5442, but the discus-
sion preceding the ruling clearly reflects the view of the par-
ticipants that States were liable for misused funds. As Sen-
ator Stennis observed, "It has to be paid back." Id., at 
S5428; see id., at S5427 (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). Not 
only have members of Congress stated their views, but Con-
gress has acted on those views. 12 In 1974, it enacted a provi-
sion limiting the liability of state and local educational agen-
12 "Here we have Congress at its most authoritative, adding complex and 
sophisticated amendments to an already complex and sophisticated act. 
Congress is not merely expressing an opinion . . . but is acting on what it 
understands its own prior acts to mean." Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Weinber-




BELL v. NEW JERSEY 
-
cies for refunds to those payments received by them within 
five years before the final written notice of liability. Pub. 
93--380, § 106, 88 Stat. 512, 20 U. S. C. § 884. 13 Pennsylvania 
has argued that this provision has general applicability, and 
that Congress drafted it to cover other programs, which ex-
plicitly impose liability on recipients for misused funds. 
Brief for Respondent Pennsylvania 32. While the provision 
by its terms does apply to a number of programs adminis-
tered by the Secretary, the State's argument fails, for both 
the statutory provision and the legislative history specifically 
refer to grants under Title I of ESEA, and the legislative his-
tory identifies the recent audits under Title I as the source of 
the Committee's concern. See H. R. Rep. No. 93-805, pp. 
79, 156 (1974). 
The Department has long held our view of the statute, for 
it sought repayment of misused funds. See e.g., Depart-
ment of Education, ESEA Audit Files 09-20033 (refund re-
quested October 6, 1975 for fiscal years 1970 and 1971, and 
received May 25, 1978), 05-90178 (refund requested Septem-
13 This aspect of the provision was eliminated in the 1978 amendments, by 
Pub. 95-561 , § 901(b), 92 Stat. 2305. 
The Senate version of the 1974 bill included a new remedy: specific per-
formance. The bill provided that, as long as the recipient retained funds, 
the Secretary could seek specific performance of the grant "contract" in the 
federal courts. See S.1539, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 434(c)(2) (1974). Al-
though the Conference Committee eventually eliminated the provision, 
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1211, p. 184 (1974), the Senate approved the remedy 
because it gave the Secretary a means of inducing compliance without the 
interruption of Title I programs involved in applying the withholding rem-
edy. S. Rep. N. 93-763, pp. 63, 211 (1974). The Senate's version ad-
dresses a different question than § 415. The concern addressed by the 
proposed § 434(c)(2) was that beneficiaries not lose services in the future 
because of the failure of the recipient of the grant to live up to its duties. 
Once the beneficiaries have already lost the services because of past mis-
use of funds, as opposed to current noncompliance, the Senate Committee's 
discussion of remedies is no longer applicable. Particularly in the light of 
the contemporaneous enactment of § 884, we view the Senate's version of 
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ber 3, 1971 for period September 1, 1966-August 31, 1967, 
and received by October 26, 1971), 04-10001 (refund re-
quested January 29, 1973 for period July 1, 1965-June 30, 
1969, and received by April 27, 1973); H. R. Rep. No. 
93-805, supra, p. 79 (discussing recent audits); Washington 
Research Project of the Southern Center for Studies in Pub-
lic Policy & NAACP Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 
Title I of ESEA: Is it Helping Poor Children? 52 (rev. ed. 
1969). Indeed, in the discussion of Senator DeConcini's pro-
posed amendment, Senator Schmitt cited some 44 instances 
of repayments by recipients of misused Title I funds. 127 
Cong. Rec. at 85428-85429 (May 21, 1981). Finally, it is 
worth noting that commentators on the pre-1978 version of 
ESEA assumed without discussion that the Department pos-
sessed the power to request refunds, although they fre-
quently castigated the Department for its failure to exercise 
that power more often. 14 
Arguing against this consistent understanding of the pre-
1978 ESEA, the States attempt to explain § 415 as a provi-
sion covering payments made "accidentally." Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 36. Even accepting that interpretation, we remain 
convinced that the provision covers payments misused as the 
Board determined these to have been. Grants of misused 
funds result from the "accident" of the Secretary's reliance on 
assurances by the State that the recipient will use the funds 
in a program that complies with Title I, when in fact the re-
cipient misuses the funds. 15 
1
• Comment, Federal Aid to Education: Title I at the Operational Level, 
1971 L. & Soc. Order 324, 350; Washington Research Project of the South-
ern Center for Studies in Public Policy & NAACP Defense and Educational 
Fund, Inc. , Title I of ESEA: Is it Helping Poor Children? 52 (rev. ed. 
1969); see Berke & Kirst, The Federal Role in American School Finance: A 
Fiscal and Administrative Analysis, 61 Geo. L. J. 927, 944 and n. 71 (1973); 
Murphy, Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Education 
Reform, 41 Harv. Educ. Rev. 35, 44-45 (1971). 
15 Pennsylvania also suggests that "overpayment" means only funds that 




BELL v. NEW JERSEY 
-
A more substantial argument against our interpretation of 
§ 415 is suggested by the opinion of the Court of Appeals. 16 
The 1978 amendments make it crystal clear that, at least for 
any period governed by the amendments, the recipient will 
be liable for misused funds. The amendments included 
§ 185(b), which provides: 
"The Commissioner shall adopt procedures to assure 
timely and appropriate resolution of audit findings and 
recommendations arising out of audits. . . . Such pro-
cedures shall include timetables for each step of the audit 
resolution process and an audit appeals process. 
Where, under such procedures, the audit resolution 
process requires the repayment of Federal funds which 
were misspent or misapplied, the Commissioner shall re-
quire the repayment of the amount of funds under this 
subchapter which have been finally determined through 
the audit resolution process to have been misspent or 
misapplied. Such repayment may be made from funds 
derived from non-Federal sources or from Federal funds 
no accountability of whish is required to the Federal 
Government. Such repayments may be made in either a 
single payment or in installment payments over a period 
not to exceed three years." 20 U. S. C. § 2835 (1976 ed. 
Supp. IV). 
The Court of Appeals feared that interpreting the pre-1978 
version of ESEA as providing liability for misused funds ren-
dered § 185 "plain[ly] redundan[t]." App. to Pet. for Cert. 
ent Pennsylvania at 31. We see no indication of such a limitation in the 
statutory language or in the legislative history, and, indeed, we would find 
it difficult to believe that Congress meant to permit States to obtain good 
title to funds otherwise owing to the Federal Government by the simple 
expedient of spending them. 
1
• The Court of Appeals relied on the argument in deciding that § 424 of 
GEPA, now renumbered as § 437, did not recognize the liability of the 
States to refund misused funds. The argument applies equally to § 415. 
-
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18a. We share the reluctance of the Court of Appeals to con-
strue a statute in a fashion that leaves some provisions super-
fluous, but we cannot agree that our construction presents 
that problem. Section 185 and the accompanying provisions 
of the 1978 amendments were, in the words of the Senate Re-
port, designed to "clarif[ y] HEW's legal authority and 
responsibility to audit applicant programs" and to "specif[y] 
certain minimum standards concerning the resolution of out-
standing audits." S.Rep. No. 95-856, p. 137 (1978) (empha-
sis added); see H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, p. 53 (describing the 
amendments as requiring that the Secretary "regularize" the 
process"). As the House Report explained, "[N]othing in 
these new provisions should be interpreted as radically 
changing the present relationship of the Federal government 
to the States. . . . These amendments, rather, are meant 
merely to lay out responsibilities more clearly .... " Id., at 
142. Section 185 itself requires the Secretary to set timeta-
bles for each step of the audit resolution process, and it re-
quires an appeals process. Further, the provision requires 
that the Secretary demand repayment once liability is estab-
lished, rather than leaving the method of collection entirely 
to his discretion from the beginning. And it limits the Secre-
tary's discretion with regard to installment payments, impos-
ing a maximum period of 3 years. Construing the pre-1978 
ESEA to provide for liability, then, does not leave § 185 
meaningless. On the contrary, § 185 plays an important role 
in specifying the procedures to be followed in the determina-
tion of the amount of the debt and in the collection of the 
debt. Thus, the enactment of the 1978 amendments does not 
undermine our construction. Indeed, the legislative history 
of the 1978 amendments strongly supports viewing the pre-
1978 ESEA as we do. As we have discussed, supra, at--, 
the debates in the House proceeded on the assumption that 
the liability existed. The House Report also identified as 
one of the problems with existing law the failure of the 
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funds misused. H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, supra, p. 50. In 
sum, not only does our conclusion give meaning to the efforts 
of the 95th Congress, it gives meaning to their understanding 
of the law that they were amending. Accordingly, we ad-
here to our view that the pre-1978 version of ESEA requires 
that recipients be held liable for funds that they misuse. 17 
IV 
New Jersey, relying on our decision in National League of 
Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), also urges that the im-
position of liability for misused funds interferes with state 
sovereignty, in violation of the Tenth Amendment. It views 
our construction of the statute as presenting it with "unpalat-
able" alternatives: making a special appropriation to repay 
the misused funds, or cutting back its budget for education 
by the amount owed to the Federal Government. Brief for 
Respondent New Jersey 28-29. Either alternative, it asserts, 
infringes its sovereignty. 
We cannot agree. Requiring States to honor the obliga-
tions voluntarily assumed as a condition of federal funding 
before recognizing their ownership of funds simply does not 
intrude on their sovereignty. The State chose to participate 
in the Title I program and, as a condition of receiving the 
grant, freely gave its assurances that it would abide by the 
17 The States have also argued that Pennhurst State School v. 
Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), requires a different view of the effect of 
the pre-1978 version of the statute. Pennhurst required that Congress 
act "unambiguously" when it intends to impose a condition on the grant of 
federal money. Id. , at 17. The States argue that Congress did not speak 
unambiguously before 1978 in imposing liability and it therefore was not 
effective in imposing liability. We disagree. As our discussion shows, we 
think that the plain language of the statute is sufficiently clear, and ESEA 
meets Pennhurst's requirement of legislative clarity. Moreover, 
Pennhurst arose in the context of imposing an unexpected condition for 
compliance-a new obligation for participating States-while here our con-
cern is with the remedies available against a noncomplying State. 
-
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conditions of Title I. See generally Pennhurst State School 
v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981); Quern v. Mandley, 436 
U. S. 725, 734 (1978); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 408 
(1970); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 
330 U. S. 127, 143-144 (1947); 1 R. Cappalli, Federal Grants 
and Cooperative Agreements § 1:09 (1982). As we must as-
sume at this stage of the litigation, the State failed to fulfill 
those assurances, and it therefore became liable for the funds 
misused, as the grant specified. New Jersey has not chal-
lenged the program itself as intruding unduly on its sover-
eignty, see Brief for Respondent New Jersey 19-20, but chal-
lenges only the requirement that it account for funds that it 
accepted under admittedly valid conditions with which it 
failed to comply. If the conditions were valid, the State had 
no sovereign right to retain funds without complying with 
those conditions. 
V 
Once we have established the right of the Federal Govern-
ment to recover funds misused by the States, we are con-
fronted with the question how, under the statutory scheme, 
the Federal Government must assert its rights. Again, we 
agree with the Secretary's view that the initial determination 
is to be made administratively. The statute clearly assigned 
to the agency the duty of auditing grant recipients, see 
GEPA §437, 20 U. S. C. § 1232f, and it is in the auditing 
process that the misuse of funds, and its magnitude, will sur-
face. Further, the provision that supports the Secretary's 
right to recover funds , § 415 of GEPA, 20 U. S. C. § 1226a-1 
(1976 ed. Supp. V), refers to adjustments to be made for over-
payments "as the Secretary may determine." Conse-
quently, we conclude that the determination of the existence 
and amount of the liability are committed to the agency, in 
the first instance. 
The States, of course, had an opportunity to present their 
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to the agency. After the initial determination by the audi-
tors, the Department provided the States an opportunity for 
review before the Board, see App. 137-138, 144-145, 
158-165, and, once that body rendered its decision, the De-
partment invited the States to submit comments before the 
Board's decision became the final decision of the Secretary, 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a, 86a-87a. Also, the agency's deci-
sion is subject to judicial review. The 1978 amendments ex-
plicitly provide for review in the courts of appeal. Even 
without an explicit provision for judicial review, review was 
also available under the pre-1978 version of ESEA, for in the 
absence of strong indications that a statute commits a deci-
sion irrevocably to agency discretion, 5 U. S. C. §§ 701(a), 
702, 704; Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, supra, 387 U. S. 
136, the propriety of the agency's action presents a federal 
question cognizable in the district courts, see n.3, supra. 
Review of the Education Appeal Board lies in the courts of 
appeal, ESEA § 195, 20 U. S. C. § 2851 (1976 ed. Supp. V); 
GEP A § 455, 20 U. S. C. § 1234d (1976 ed. Supp. V) , so, in 
cases like the present ones, which began before the Title I 
Audit Board and which were transferred to the Education 
Appeal Board, judicial review is available in the courts of ap-
peal. See Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U. S. 506, 508 (1916) 
(change of forum can be applied retroactively); n.3, supra. 
Thus, on remand, the States will have an opportunity to liti-
gate in the Court of Appeals whether the findings of the Sec-
retary are supported by substantial evidence and reflect 
application of the proper legal standards. § 455, 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1234d(c); 5 U. S. C. § 706. 
VI 
In these cases, then, we conclude that the Secretary has 
followed the proper procedures. He has administratively 
determined the amount of the debt owed by each State to the 
Federal Government, see note 4, supra, as he is empowered 
to do. Whether that determination is supported by substan-
-
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tial evidence and by the application of the proper legal stand-
ards is a question for the courts, if the affected parties seek 
judicial review. Here, New Jersey and Pennsylvania sought 
that review, and we remand to the Court of Appeals to per-
mit it to undertake to review the Secretary's determination. 
Accordingly, the case is reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
-
May 18, 1983 
81- 2125 Bell v. New Jersey 
Dear Sandra: ~ 
Please join me . 
Justice O'Connor 
lfp/ss 





JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. 
-
.iUF tntt cqourl .cf tfrt ~h ,jtah.9' 
:.l;t,9'~ 19. QJ. 2!1gi~~ 
May 18, 1983 
Re: No. 81-2125 
-






I - - • I 
! ' / L 
,; __,,. 
Copies to the Conference 
- -
.;§u:punu QJcurl cf ut~ 'J!inilib' .;§ta:ftll' 
:.a.s-.qiu:ghm. ~- QJ. 20ffe.l!-,1 
CHAMBERS Of'" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 18, 1983 
Re: 81-2125 - Bell v. New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania 
Dear Sandra: 




Copies to the Conference 
.. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
-
.:§u:vrtmt <!Jo-n:rt of tlrt ~th .:§tatt.s-
~frmghm. ~. QJ. 20ffe)l.$ 
-
May 19, 1983 
I 
Re: 81-2125 - Bell v. New Jersey and Pennsylvania 
Dear Sandra, 
I join you and may write a few words on the side. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 




JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
-
,§u:prrnu <!Jo-nrl o-f t~t :!!iniu~ ~tat.cs 
'J)n IUl fringto-tt, ~. <!J. 2 0 gi-'¼ $ 
-
May 19, X '983 
Re: No. 81-2125 - Bell and New Jersey and Pennsylvania 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Justice O'Connor 

















• .:§upumr QJcurt cf tfrr ~th $itau.G 
~lHlfrington. tl:l. {!J. 2llffe.ll,~ 
CHAMBERS O F" 
J U STIC E W ILLIAM H . REH NQUIST 
May 25, 1983 
Re: No. 81-2125 Bell v. New Jersey 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Justice O'Connor 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -
~ltpTmtt QJllllrl of ut~ ~b ~tatts 
~aslfin-ghtn. ,. QJ. 211'.;r~~ 
May 25, 1983 
/ 
Re: No. 81-2125, Bell v. New Jersey and Pennsylvania 
Dear Sandra: 
I join. 
Justice O'Connor ... 





}-% Jf 0 r, ,__ Oo - ........ en 1< )~ )~ ln .._ VJ ~ ~ 
~ 
en I;:) ri 
~ v'I ~ --...; ~~ . ---.......::. \I') 
" ~ M 
~ ~ 
1..1,,, --:I: V1 ~ 




~ 3:: ~ (]) 
<::::) r"\ z 
~ V) ~ . 
..:i 1~ :> r-l \"'\ 
' r-l 
"' ~ 
\J n lJ') 
o:i 
~ N < ~ ,...; . V1 N \1---- I :I: cl-:: ,...; l-, CX) 
~ <"'\ 






\J r\ :rt~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ......_ o:i Li 1J'¢-
~ 
.:::i ~ t'\ ~ ~ 
::i JI 
- \J I C""l ~ \)o ~ V) ~ 
rj "' 
c::J l~ ::: ~ -
